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Abstract—This work is a technical approach to modeling
false information nature, design, belief impact and containment
in multi-agent networks. We present a Bayesian mathematical
model for source information and viewer’s belief, and how the
former impacts the latter in a media (network) of broadcast-
ers and viewers. Given the proposed model, we study how a
particular information (true or false) can be optimally designed
into a report, so that on average it conveys the most amount of
the original intended information to the viewers of the network.
Consequently, the model allows us to study susceptibility of a
particular group of viewers to false information, as a function of
statistical metrics of the their prior beliefs (e.g. bias, hesitation,
open-mindedness, credibility assessment etc.). In addition, based
on the same model we can study false information “containment”
strategies imposed by network administrators. Specifically, we
study a credibility assessment strategy, where every disseminated
report must be within a certain distance of the truth. We study the
trade-off between false and true information-belief convergence
using this scheme which leads to ways for optimally deciding
how truth sensitive an information dissemination network should
operate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Adversarial spread of false information based on exploita-
tion of viewer’s naivety, gullibility and bias has been remarked
numerously over social media and news networks, most no-
tably in the midst of the most recent US presidential election
and Brexit [1]–[5]. The notion is familiarly referred to as
fake news. However, manipulative demonstration and spread of
false information is not limited to news, and indisputably exists
in other domains such as advertising [6]–[9], financial markets
(electronic trading) [10], [11], cyber-security [12], adversarial
machine learning [13], [14] and more, often referred to by
terms such as misinformation or disinformation.
When it comes to studying false information spread, the
goals are multifaceted and significantly vague. This is due
to various reasons. Firstly, The nature of false information
is highly context-dependent and debatable. The notion of
fake news for instance is not fully resolved and well-defined
for many [15]–[17]. The practice of fake news fabrication
and broadcasting can take various forms, from an individual
creating and promoting fake social media posts, news websites
etc. [18], to manipulative journalism of well-established news
organizations doing so with the intention of appealing to a
certain group of audience [19]. False news creation and spread
is also not necessarily bound to malicious intention, and can
be a mere reflection of erroneous, exaggerative or neglectful
quoting of absorbed facts, rumors, panic epidemics and similar
phenomena. Furthermore, false information spread can affect
different systems in different ways, and consequently, admin-
istrators decide to handle it in various forms: identification,
detection, prediction, regulation, education or even ignorance
are common mechanism that are usually adopted to combat
false information [20]. Nevertheless, one needs to identify
and study the following aspects of false information in their
corresponding contexts:
1. Nature. What is false information, how is it
originated/designed, and what distinguishes it from the
truth?
2. Impact. How does false information or fake news impact
beliefs of the users/viewers of a system/network, and how
does that in turn affect the dynamics of information flow and
system operation?
3. Detection. What methodologies can be used to identify
false information accurately and efficiently?
4. Spread (epidemic). In an interactive network where
information is propagated in a distributed way by users and
outside feeds, what are the chances of epidemic false news
spread as a function of network parameters?
5. Containment and mitigation. What mechanisms can
prevent false information dissemination, or offset it with
truth? At what costs can those strategies be implemented and,
what are the expected outcomes and damages?
Mathematical modeling of false information is far more
challenging than semantic and social analysis, due to lack
of basic fundamentals. Yet there are a handful of recent
works that have modeled various aspects of false information
nature and spread using technical methods. Most notably,
the majority of works have investigated fraudulent accounts
and credibility of news in online social networks such as
twitter [21]–[26]. A few other works have proposed models
for disseminating good information in social networks to
mitigate the effect of misinformation, thereby improving
reliability [27]–[31]. Misinformation and manipulation in
financial limit order markets are probably studied far more
in-depth, especially using game-theoretic approaches (see
e.g. [32]–[35]), due to much simpler and readily available
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numerical representations of information and beliefs. There
are recent works that have tried to adopt those approaches
in the context of social networks. For example, the study
of [30] offers a game-theoretic approach to truth and fake
news dissemination based on a mixed-strategy formulation of
volunteer’s dilemma in an adhoc social network. However,
those studies are still preliminary and immature compared
to areas where numerical representation of information is
available.
The current work is a technical (yet different) approach to false
information design, impact and containment in multi-agent
networks. We present a Bayesian mathematical model for
information, viewer’s belief, and how the former impacts the
latter in a media (network) of broadcasters and viewers. Given
the proposed model, we study how a particular information
(true or false) can be optimally designed into a report, so
that on average it conveys the most amount of the original
intended information to the viewers of the network. The model
then allows one to study susceptibility of a particular group
of viewers to false information, as a function of statistical
metrics of the their prior beliefs (e.g., bias, hesitation, open-
mindedness, etc.). In addition, based on the same model we
can study false information “containment” strategies imposed
by network administrators. Specifically, we study a credibility
assessment strategy, where every disseminated report must be
within a certain distance of the truth. We study the trade-
off between false and true information containment using this
scheme which leads to ways for optimally deciding how truth
sensitive an information dissemination network should operate.
A. Proposed Model
We consider an information dissemination network
(medium) with an information source, a transmitter (reporter),
a network administrator and multiple viewers (audience). The
schematics of such a network are illustrated in Figure 1.
 
Fig. 1: Schematics of an information dissemination network
with source, reporter, administrator and viewer.
The transmitter intends to disseminate in the network a piece
of information xs from the source. However, he can modify
the information content and design a report y, in order for
the viewers to accept as much of the source information as
possible. There is an authenticity filter in the network that
verifies every input report by comparing it with the truth. The
report is not permitted to be broadcast if it is too distant
from the truth xt. Therefore, the reporter’s optimal design
must fall in an acceptable neighborhood of the truth which
we denote by C(xt). We assume that xs, xt and y are all real
vectors of length n. For the present, work we use the simple
euclidean distance as the measure of deviation between facts:
d(x1, x2) = ‖x1 − x2‖. Therefore, the authenticity filter has
the following mathematical form:
y ∈ C(xt) = {x | ‖x− xt‖ 6 } (1)
where  is a positive constant. There are N >> 0 viewers,
and every viewer i has a prior distribution pi(x) about the
truth. When a viewer receives a report y, he/she forms a
posterior distribution given the prior belief and the observation,
and consequently adopts a new belief in a Bayesian manner,
which we denote by ζi(y). The details of the viewers belief
impact is described in the next subsection. We make the
assumption of the well-informed reporter. This means that the
reporter is fully aware of the truth xs, and also of the network
administration policy . However, the reporter is not aware of
every individual’s prior distribution. Instead, he only knows
average statistics such as mean of first and seconds moments
of the viewers’ priors, as will be explained the next section.
The reporter’s goal is to convey the source’s information to as
many viewers as possible. For a single viewer i, information
conveyance can be measured by the distance of the original
information xs and the adopted belief ζi(y):
τi,s(y) = ‖xs − ζi(y)‖ (2)
For simplicity of future reference, we call this quantity the
“reporter-viewer information convergence”, or in short “con-
vergence”. The smaller τi,s(y), the more successful the re-
porter has been for impacting that particular viewer. However,
the statistical notion of information throughput is obtained by
averaging τi,s(y) over all viewers:
τs(y) = E‖xs − ζi(y)‖ (3)
The reporter’s goal is therefore to minimize average conver-
gence τs(y) for a valid report y which is permitted to pass
through the network, i.e.
argmin
y
τs(y)
s.t. y ∈ C(xt) (4)
B. Bayesian Viewer
We model the viewer of the news (audience) as an agent i
that has a prior belief about the truth at a particular point
in time. We denote the probability distribution of this prior
with pi(·). Upon receiving a piece of report y, the viewer’
instantaneous belief of the truth (his point of view) is the
Maximum A Posteriori fact:
ζi(y) = argmax
x
pi(x|y), (5)
where the posterior distribution of the true news is obtained
from the Bayes rule :
pi(x|y) ∝ pi(x)pi(y|x) (6)
The likelihood distribution pi(y|x) is a function of the
uncertainty and credibility of the source of news in the
viewer’s mind. This is essentially an estimation of the statistics
of truth manipulation (in the mind of the viewer) that an
information source performs on the facts before disseminating
them. If in the viewer’s mind, the source of the news is
very noisy, exaggerative or inaccurate, then the likelihood
distribution pi(y|x) is very wide and has a large variance. If
there is a reporting bias to the journalism which is known to
the viewer, then the distribution is nonzero mean. In summary,
the viewer blends his prior opinion with what he/she observes,
but takes into account the presumed credibility of the source
(which could in all likelihood be false).
In a perfectly Gaussian world, we can assume that the prior
and likelihood are both n-dimensional Gaussian distributions:
pi(x) ∼ N (µi,Σi),
pi(x|y) ∼ N (y,Σs,i), (7)
where Σi and Σs,i are covariance matrices of the viewer’s prior
and the conditional likelihood distribution, respectively. Intu-
itively, Σi is a multi-dimensional measure of viewer’s intrinsic
hesitation about the state of truth at the time being, while Σs,i
measures suspicion of noisy/false reporting against the news
source. The well-informed reporter assumption means that
the reporter is not aware of individual viewer characteristics
µi,Σi,Σs,i, but has perfect knowledge of the joint distribution
of these quantities. Combining equations (5),(6),(7), we get:
log pi(x|y) ∝ −(x− µi)TΣ−1i (x− µi)− (x− y)Σ−1s,i (x− y) (8)
and by maximizing this, we get that the viewers post report
belief becomes:
ζi(y) = Aiy +Biµi , (9)
where
Ai =
(
Σ−1i + Σ
−1
s,i
)−1
Σ−1s,i ,
Bi =
(
Σ−1i + Σ
−1
s,i
)−1
Σ−1i (10)
Therefore, in the world of Gaussian news and beliefs, a viewer
adopts a linear combination of his prior belief and the viewed
report as his/her new belief.
C. Optimal Reporter
Combining equations (3),(4) and (9) together, the optimal
report y∗ is revealed to be the solution of the following
optimization:
min
y
E‖Aiy +Biµi − xs‖,
s.t. ‖y− xt‖ 6 . (11)
(11) is a convex optimization. Therefore, using the method of
Lagrange multipliers (see e.g., [36]), y∗ is the minimizer of
the following utility function for some nonnegative λ > 0:
L(y, λ) = E‖Aiy +Biµi − xs‖2 + λ‖y− xt‖2 (12)
Taking derivatives with respect to y, we get:
∂L(y, λ)
∂y
= (A2 + λI)y +ABµ−Axs − λxt (13)
where:
A2 = EATi Ai, ABµ = EATi Biµ, A = EAi. (14)
Finally, by setting (13) equal to zero, the optimal report is
obtained as:
y∗ = (A2 + λI)−1
(
λxt +Axs −ABµ
)
, (15)
where λ is the smallest nonnegative constant that makes
‖y∗ − xt‖ 6 xt. The λ in (15) is a regularization factor that
forces the report to be closer to reality. Note that the well-
informed reporter assumption means that A2, A and ABµ are
computable for the reporter, hence so is the optimal report y∗.
D. Ergodic Covariances
For further simplicity of the analysis, we consider the
case of ergodic covariances, i.e., Σi = Σ and Σi,s = Σs
for all viewers, and only mean belief µi varies. Under this
assumption, it is easy to show that
y∗ = (A2 + λI)−1 (λxt +Axs −ABµ) . (16)
When λ = 0, there is no authenticity requirement for the
report, thus the optimal report can be designed solely based on
the input source information and the viewers’ belief statistics.
Specifically:
y∗ = A−1xs −A−1Bµ = xs + ΣsΣ−1 (xs − µ) . (17)
In other words, the optimal report is the linear sum of the news
source and a skewed version of the average news surprise
(xs − µ), which can also be interpreted as exaggeration.
The optimal magnitude and rotation of such exaggeration is
determined by the relative ratio of the covariance matrices Σ
(hesitation) and Σs (source reliability). The more reliable a
source (smaller ‖Σs‖∗) or the more open minded/less certain
the viewers (larger ‖Σ‖∗), more exaggeration is allowed. ‖X‖∗
denotes the nuclear norm of a matrix X which can be a
measure of the magnitude of a covariance matrix. However,
this also tells us that elements of the report (i.e. different
coordinates of y) can be exaggerated differently, according to
the certainty distribution. It should be noted that even in the
case of a perfectly truthful source xs = xt, the optimal report
is exaggerative and not completely honest. A credibility as-
sessment strategy or filtration policy should take that fact into
consideration. In other words, enforcing truthful reporting will
compensate the performance of an optimal reporter completely
based on the truth if ‖ΣsΣ−1 (xt − µ) ‖ >> . The optimal
convergence metric τs(y∗) for λ = 0 in this case becomes:
τs(y∗) = E(µi − µ)TB2(µi − µ) (18)
which is independent of the particular piece of news xs, and
only depends on the source credibility and viewers’ belief
statistics.
E. Authentication Policy
Assuming that every reporter does the optimal action know-
ing the specified filter parameter , it is up to the network
administrator to set a value that promotes reporting based on
truthful sources and limits the unauthentic ones. This requires
definition of an appropriate truth dissemination utility function.
For a given source xs, policy parameter  and optimal report
y∗, we denote the optimal convergence with c(xs, ), which
can be obtained from the derivations of the previous section
as:
c(xs, ) = E
i
‖Ay∗ +Bµi − xs‖ (19)
The criteria for  in filter design is intuitive: average conver-
gence for a source of false information must be significantly
smaller than that of the authentic source. In addition,  should
not be not too small to limit the truthful optimal reporter.
These criteria can be represented by:
U1() = Ext,xs
(
c(xs, )− c(xt, )
∣∣∣∣ ‖xt − xs‖ > dmin) > δ,
(20)
U2() =
E
xt
c(xt,∞)
E
xt
c(xt, )
> α, (21)
where δ and α are positive constants. The first equation
states that the average convergence distance for false news
information sources must be farther than that of the true
information source by a minimum margin δ. Note that the
expectation is over the distribution of all information sources,
and an information vector is considered false if it is at a
distance dmin from the truth. The second equation on the other
hand guarantees that the network is not too restrictive for the
optimal reporter of truth compared with a free network with no
authentication policy. Combining these metrics, we can define
a unified utility function, and choose the maximizer ∗:
∗ = argmax

U()
= E
xt,xs
(
c(xs, )− c(xt, )
∣∣∣∣ ‖xt − xs‖ > dmin)
+ β
E
xt
c(xt,∞)
E
xt
c(xt, )
(22)
Fig. 2: Statistics of belief convergence of optimal report for
true information (blue) and random unauthentic information
(red).
II. NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS
We set up a basic numerical simulation to calculate and
illustrate the convergence metrics and utility functions of true
and unauthentic information sources based on the derivations
of the previous section. We consider a simple case of n =
2, with ergodic covariances Σ,Σs given below in (23). We
assume that the true information xt and source information xs
are both independently generated from a uniform distribution
of vectors on the unit 2-sphere, S2. The average viewers’ belief
µ is also drawn from the same distribution.
Σ =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, Σs =
[
0.5 0
0 0.5
]
, µi ∼ N
(
µ,
[
0.1 0
0 0.1
])
µ, xt, xs ∼ S2, (23)
In Figure 2, the average convergence for true source E‖ζ(y∗t )−
xt‖ is compared with the convergence of a random source
E‖ζ(y∗s) − xs‖, as a function of network filter parameter .
The standard deviations of the same quantities are displayed as
error areas. Since the mean belief is completely independent
of the source and truth, this figure is a representative of a
convergence trade-off in a network of indifferent audience.
Figure 3 shows convergence trade-off conditioned on the fact
that average belief is closer to the source (false) information
than the truth, i.e., ‖µ¯− xs‖ 6 ‖µ¯− xt‖. We can think of this
scenario as “uneducated audience”. Note that for larger , the
false source convergence error area is below the average con-
vergence of truth, meaning that the false information reporter
has a significant chance of conveying more information that
the truth.
Fig. 3: Statistics of belief convergence of optimal report for
true information (blue) and random unauthentic information
(red), for uneducated audience ‖µ¯− xs‖ 6 ‖µ¯− xt‖.
Figure 4 shows convergence trade-off conditioned on the fact
that average belief is farther to the source (false) information
than the truth ‖µ¯− xs‖ > ‖µ¯− xt‖.
Fig. 4: Statistics of belief convergence of optimal report for
true information (blue) and random unauthentic information
(red), for educated audience ‖µ¯− xs‖ > ‖µ¯− xt‖.
.
Finally, an example of network utility function for β =
1.6, dmin = 1.1 as a function of  is shown in Figure 5.
 
Fig. 5: Example of network utilities for β = 1.6, dmin = 1.1.
III. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
A Bayesian model for information, viewer’s belief and the
impact of the former on the latter was proposed in this work.
The model was studied from the point of an optimal reporter
intending to convey the message of a particular source to a
statistically large group of viewers, through a network that
implements a basic authentication policy. The simplifying
assumption of numerical information vectors and Gaussian
priors, posteriors and belief impact was made. The reporter
was also assumed to be well-informed, which means he has
the knowledge of truth, network policy and joint distribution
of viewers’ belief statistics. Consequently, we derived the
formulation of the optimal reporter, and showed that it is a
linear combination of a portion of truth, source information
and exaggeration. In addition, knowing this optimal strategy,
we studied the optimal choice of the network authentication
policy parameter. If the policy is too restrictive, it hurdles
the performance of a well-intended reporter that only uses
exaggerative techniques to convey the truth to an uneducated
or biased audience. However, too loose of a policy grants a
large capacity for false information dissemination to false or
malicious sources. We proposed a computable utility function
that takes these factors into account, and can be optimized for
the best choice of authentication policy.
Given that this study is the first of its own kind, the proposed
model is expected to be significantly more progressed in
the future work, in order to account for more practicalities.
First and foremost, our primary goal for a follow-up work
would be to validate the model with real-world data in various
contexts (social media, news websites and electronic trading
platforms). Secondly, we intend to incorporate less perfect
assumptions such partially informed reporters, and selective
or random authentication policies, and provide more analytical
and concrete derivations than those of the current work.
Another limitation of the current model is that it is very static.
In reality the source credibility parameters Σs,i is a function
of the long term reporting of a source, and varies through the
time. Furthermore, viewers have ways of cross-validating and
comparing information coming from different sources. Other
model parameters are also expected to be dynamic.
The present model is also passive, which means the viewers
do not spread the information, and are only receivers of it.
A very interesting study would be to adopt the current model
and study dynamics of belief evolution and propagation in
a network where viewers act as two-way agents passing and
receiving information.
Finally, the role of education can be explained and studied with
the current model to some extent. Education can be considered
as a meta-function that skews viewers beliefs towards the truth
over time. Given the importance of education in the age of
social media and abundance of information, we believe that it
is essential to provide modeling tools for studying its role in
prevention of misinformation.
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